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Abstract
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect, the European Parliament became a core player in the decision-making pro-
cesses of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its external dimensions. This new role suggested a shift towards
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1. Introduction
Research on the EU’s foreign economic policies has long
focused mainly on the impact of the principal-agent
dynamics between the European Commission (EC) and
the Council, the influence of commercial lobby groups,
and the efficiency of EU negotiating strategies. To be
sure, concerns about input—and output—legitimacy of-
ten provided an implicit background theme to these stud-
ies. And yet, in recent years, the elevated level of soci-
etal contestation and political controversy reached by de-
bates over EU foreign economic policy, particularly trade
policy, has been rather unexpected. As detailed in this
special issue, the burgeoning power of the European
Parliament (EP) over the past decade has significantly
extended the potential for societal contestation, far be-
yond the situation which existed when the Council and
the EC still reigned supreme in foreign economic policy.
The EP has become a focal point for research on this
phenomenon, which is usually described as a process of
politicization of EU politics.
Politicization as a concept has beenusedwith increas-
ing frequency to analyze heightened political conflict and
public controversy in many EU-related policy fields. But
there remains an open question; canwe also use this con-
cept of politicization to analyze issues that are not as vis-
ible on the public radar and not as prominent on the par-
liamentary agenda as, for example, Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement, even though the EP
has been empowered in a very similar way in these less
prominent areas (Rosén, 2016)?
Indeed, as De Bièvre and Poletti (2019) have shown,
many lower profile trade negotiations generate hardly
any public contestation. Hutter, Kriesi and Grande (2016,
p. 280) talk about “punctuated politicization” which
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varies across time, context and country. Hurrelmann,
Gora and Wagner maintain that “only the most funda-
mental aspects of European integration…are politicized
in the population, while the EU’s policy-making activities
remain largely non-salient” (2015, p. 44). But is this also
true for the recently parliamentarized Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) of the EU and its external dimensions? Can
we nonetheless speak of politicization in this area, bear-
ing in mind that the June 2019 European elections strik-
ingly demonstrated the salience of environmental con-
cerns for European politics? If so, what does such a pat-
tern of politicization look like? These are the questions
this article seeks to answer.
I will first trace the extent of politicization in the CFP,
specifically in its external dimension. I will then propose
the concept of ‘layered politicization’ to deal with a pat-
tern of politicization that is incomplete and less compre-
hensive than is the case in the usual empirical studies
of politicization (e.g., European integration per se, EU
trade policy or European migration policies). Specifically,
I will look at the role the EP played in causing this pat-
tern. Finally, I will examine EU external fisheries poli-
cies through an analysis of so-called Sustainable Fisheries
Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) and discuss the effects
of this layered form of politicization.
There is a substantial literature on how to de-
fine politicization in a given policy field. For De Wilde,
Leupold and Schmidtke (2016) politicization consists of
three elements: (i) the growing salience and visibility
of a policy, (ii) an increasing polarization of opinions in
this field, and (iii) an expansion of the number of actors
and audiences involved in decision-making processes re-
lated to this policy (for a similar conceptualization, see
Hutter, Kriesi, & Grande, 2016, p. 8). Essentially, then,
politicization refers to a situation in which a policy field
that was previously subject to almost exclusively techno-
cratic and elite-driven policy making with limited public
controversy becomes the subject of public debate and
polarization (De Wilde et al., 2016).
A number of scenarios can give rise to politicization.
These include civil society groups and (often forgotten)
commercial groups vigorously taking up a particular topic
in an attempt to win strong public attention; political par-
ties making the issue part of their platforms (Hooghe
& Marks, 2009, pp. 18–19); and mainstream media out-
lets regularly publishing on the topic. In this way, a pol-
icy which was previously characterized by an insider dis-
course, insider bargaining and insider dealings without
public debate is transformed.
Inevitably, however, this definition begs the question
as towhen the threshold is reached at which a previously
non-politicized issue becomes politicized. As noted by,
for example, Faber and Orbie (2007), trade policy mak-
ing always involved a variety of actors and was debated
intensively among them. It is also possible that some as-
pects of an issue are contested strongly (see the investor-
state dispute settlement in TTIP), whereas the bulk of it
is still dealt with behind closed doors.
Such an uneven pattern of politicization also seems
to characterize the CFP and its external dimensions. The
CFP is certainly not an issue that regularly captures the
headlines. At the same time, it has undoubtedly become
more controversial and, despite the comprehensive 2013
reform, it usually has a negative press. A substantial num-
ber of environmental NGOs have become active in this
area, while highly successful documentaries have high-
lighted the parlous state of the marine environment. It
is usually in such contexts that the CFP is targeted.
To establish a measure of the politicization of the
CFP, I will use the three generally accepted dimensions
of politicization mentioned above (salience, polarization,
mobilization). I will trace the development of the CFP
with respect to these three factors, paying particular at-
tention to its external dimension. As we shall see, this
analysis reveals a hybrid pattern of politicization, which
I try to capture with the concept of ‘layered politiciza-
tion’. I will also briefly discuss the effects of this devel-
opment. The existing literature has generally identified
two broad sets of consequences of politicization. Zürn
(2014, pp. 58–59) and others have stated that politicized
policy fields are less prone to being captured by spe-
cial interests, and are more responsive to broader soci-
etal concerns and diffuse interests. This imposes losses
on particular lobbies, leading to more transparency and
better access for societal groups. Conversely, the more
problematic consequences of politicization include less
efficient policy-making in terms of output, with a sig-
nificantly higher rate of ratification failures (Hooghe &
Marks, 2009). Can these effects also be observed in a
(partially) politicized CFP?
1.1. Research Design and Data
The politicization literature has employed a variety of
methods to measure politicization in a given policy
field. Scholars have examined the reflection of politi-
cized EU policies in party manifestos (De Vries & Hobolt,
2015; Hooghe & Marks, 2018), the activities of lobby
organizations (Dür & Mateo, 2016), the intensity of
mass media debates (for example, Hutter et al., 2016;
Schmidtke, 2016), and trends in public opinion research
(Hurrelmann, Gora, & Wagner, 2015).
This research has analyzed some of the most com-
mon indicators of politicization over time. Imeasured the
salience of EU fisheries policy by tracing its prominence
in national newspapers from four of the largest member
states, three ofwhich are home to large fishing industries
(i.e., France, Spain and the UK; Germany is the fourth
country). Articles were searched in the respective lan-
guages on whether they mentioned the CFP or elements
of the external dimension of EU fisheries policies, such
as partnership agreements. Party manifestos of party
groups in the EP prior to the 2019 elections were investi-
gated for evidence of heightened concern with fisheries
policies. The expansion of actors was traced through a
review of the evolution of the CFP, with a focus on exter-
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nal governance, and through an analysis of the involve-
ment of new actors in decision-making. This also testi-
fies to a measure of polarization, because it shows how
a relatively closely-knit community of decision-makers in
fisheries policies has greatly expanded over time.
The case studies themselves are based on a detailed
tracing of the negotiation processes, primarily through
a comprehensive analysis of official documents from all
major EU institutions involved in the negotiations, aswell
as from specialized agencies, evaluations by think-tanks
and NGOs, and press articles. Some open questions were
clarified in confidential interviews with a high-ranking
official from the EU’s Directorate-General for Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare).
2. Politicization of Fisheries Policy in the EU?
For decades, fisheries have been a neglected aspect of
European integration. Even today, it has almost no place
in most textbooks on the EU. Indeed, the CFP was barely
mentioned in the Rome treaties. It was initially consid-
ered part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and
thus subject to supranational governance. Only with the
accession to the European Community of important fish-
ing nations, such as the UK, Spain or Portugal, did fish-
eries become an issue of concern for European politics.
The principles of the CAP were used in the first fish-
eries regulations. They provided for a common market
in fisheries products and structural aid for fishing re-
gions (Penas Lado, 2016, p. 22). The external dimen-
sion of EU fishing policy was even more sparsely regu-
lated, and there were few rules that governed the activi-
ties of EU vessels. In 1982, however, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed into effect.
This law gave marine states jurisdiction over an Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) that stretched 200 nautical miles
from the shoreline. Partly as a reaction, the EU formally
adopted the CFP in 1983. About a quarter of the fish
taken by EU vessels came from waters outside the EU,
which lent a vital importance to international policies
and agreements. Since the 1990s, the EU has intensified
the external dimension of its fisheries policy by negoti-
ating access rights via so-called partnership agreements
and by participating in international fisheries manage-
ment organizations.
The early CFP was governed by a marine-industrial
complex in which the distribution of quotas and the writ-
ing of complicated regulations was negotiated behind
closed doors (Lövin, 2012; Wakefield, 2016, pp. 55–57).
This process was dominated by the core fishing nations
of the EU in the Council, particularly Spain and France.
Big sector organizations like Europêche and the French
and Spanish fisheries organizationswith their permanent
representatives in Brussels exerted a strong influence
through lobbying, much as influential agricultural groups
had in the CAP (Griffin, 2013; Payne, 2000). Scientific ad-
vice was requested, but the recommendations were usu-
ally disregarded (Daw & Gray, 2005).
To be sure, there have been a few flare-ups, such as
the Cod Wars between the UK and Iceland in the mid-
1970s and the Spanish–Canadian turbot war of 1994–96.
Generally, however, the execution of the CFP at the
EU-level was characterized by low public salience and
was subject to control by a limited number of deci-
sion makers (Penas Lado, 2016, pp. 275–276). Conflicts
were usually dealt with in the Council without signifi-
cant public involvement. Protests against the CFP were
highly concentrated in local fishing communities that
felt disadvantaged by EU regulations, such as Scottish
fishermen (a constituency which, predictably enough,
voted for Brexit). Despite clear signs of mismanagement
and unsustainable exploitation, no substantial changes
occurred until the turn of the millennium. It was at
this point that the environmental consequences of over-
fishing became glaringly obvious (Penas Lado, 2016,
pp. 232–249).
In 2002, these grave problems were acknowledged
for the first time by a comprehensive CFP reform. The
agent of this new emphasis on sustainability was not the
public but rather the EC. Certainly, this new-found en-
thusiasm clearly reflected the rise of environmental par-
ties and civil society organizations within the EU. Starting
with the reform of 2002, the EU claimed to switch the
focus of its agreements with foreign partners. The lat-
ter were now re-branded as fisheries partnership agree-
ments (FPAs), replacing a pure concernwith access rights
to a broader agenda encompassing structural and logis-
tical aid for partner countries as well as environmental
considerations (Witbooi, 2008; Witbooi, 2012). The re-
form also created so-called Regional Advisory Councils to
allow for a greater involvement of diverse stakeholders.
The narrative of the negotiations changed substantially
and the number of involved actors increased. However,
the actual content of the agreements and the activities
of the EU fishing industry did not yet reflect this (Daw &
Gray, 2005; Gegout, 2016).
Thus, despite the reform, complaints by NGOs and
scientists about the exploitation of the seas and the role
of the EU became stronger, and public alarm grew ac-
cordingly. The EC sought to present itself as a progres-
sive force, which resulted in 2009 in the publication of a
Green Paper (EC, 2009). A public debate on the propos-
als was initiated, which generated 394 responses mostly
from industry and the general public. 63 statements by
civil society organizations and 65 from national or re-
gional governments were received (EC, 2010).
On 1 January 2014, a comprehensive CFP reform
went into effect. This reform stressed the normative di-
mension of fisheries policies. The FPAs were renamed
SFPAs. The reform process was decisively shaped by the
new range of actors who weighed in on the debate.
For example, numerous NGOs seized on the opportu-
nity provided by the Ocean2012 coalition, which united
193 groups in 24 member countries. Most importantly,
however, the Lisbon Treaty empowered the EP by giv-
ing it co-decision making powers in the CFP, which en-
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compassed the external dimension. Due to this develop-
ment, any agreement in this area now requires the EP’s
endorsement according to the consent procedure (that
is, after a single reading, the EP is given the option to ac-
cept or reject the results, but not to amend them). Prior
to the vote in the plenary, the EP Fisheries Committee
(PECH) discusses the draft agreement and gives its opin-
ion. In recent years, there were often sharp divisions
within the Committee. Other EP Committees, in partic-
ular those on Development and the Budget, usually also
discuss the draft agreement and recommend approval or
disapproval. Once the EP gives its consent, the Council
can ratify the agreement. As in trade policy, both the EP
and the Council have veto power when it comes to the
ratification of agreements.
After the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, the EP immedi-
ately became very active in fisheries policy. Greene and
Cross (2015, p. 8) found that plenary speeches by MEPs
on CFP topics rose strongly after the Green Paper was
published by the EC. In a 2012 resolution on the exter-
nal dimension of the CFP, the EP called on the EC to ne-
gotiate not with the main objective of “obtaining fishing
rights for EU vessels but [rather]…with the aim of attain-
ing comparable sustainable management rules as the EU
in the third partner country” (EP, 2012). And indeed, reg-
ulation 1380/2013 of December 11, 2013, which codifies
the reformed CFP, essentially comprises a statement by
the Council and the EP stressing their commitment to
such objectives in partnership agreements (EP & Council
of the European Union, 2013). The long deliberative pro-
cess of the reform firmly entrenched sustainability as the
dominant discourse in the EU’s CFP. This also reflected
public opinion in most EU countries (see, for example,
Client Earth, 2018).
Given this external normative pressure, the EC be-
gan to closely coordinate negotiations with the EP
(Zimmermann, 2016) and systematically tried to enlist
the EP’s legitimation resources (see Rosén, 2016). The
Lisbon Treaty thus ensured that rules guiding decision-
making involved many diverse actors. The formerly tech-
nocratic decision-making process that had characterized
this policy field was thus severely compromised. The
emergence of the EP as a key player gave many actors
a new forum to make their voices heard.
Despite all of this, the CFP and its external dimen-
sions only partially exhibit the characteristics of a politi-
cized policy field. There is clearly a continuous expan-
sion of relevant actors in the decision-making process
(criterium iii) and there are sharp divisions among them,
with the attendant strong contestation of the CFP and its
components (criterium ii). However, the public salience
of the issue (criterium i) remains rather limited.
This is substantiated by a comprehensive search in
themedia regarding the public attention garnered by the
CFP over the past twenty years (that is, the approximate
time period in which public contestation of European
fisheries policies began to extend beyond the confines
of regional fisheries communities). A Nexis search of
English, German, French and Spanish language newspa-
pers showed that the CFP was not very frequently the
object of articles. This pattern remained constant until
2016, though there was a small spike during the debate
about the CFP reform. The precipitous rise in English-
language papers after 2016 is due to Brexit, particularly
the widely reported protest activity of Brexit campaign-
ers against the withdrawal deal with the EU. This culmi-
nated in the dumping of dead fish into the Thames by
Nigel Farage and his co-campaigners. Given the much
higher number of British papers in the database, British
published opinion is over-represented (Figure 1).
The same trend is visible if one searches the same
terms in selected ‘quality’ journals (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Search in Nexis Database of about 2300 European newspapers (among those 211 German, 211 French, 1113
British, 61 Spanish). Search Terms: Common Fisheries Policy, EU Fisheries Policy, European Union + Fisheries Policies (and
translations of these terms in German, French and Spanish).
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Figure 2. Search in Nexis Database on Selected Newspapers. German (Tagesspiegel, taz, die tageszeitung, Die Welt, Die
ZEIT, Welt am Sonntag); English (The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, Daily Mail, The Daily Mail andMail on Sunday); French
(Le Monde, Le Figaro, Le Figaro Online); Spanish (El Pais, El Mundo). Search terms are the same as in Figure 1.
Overall, then, there seems to be no sustained public
debate in EU countries on fisheries, at least not one that
is reflected in newspapers.
The same pattern emerges from an examination of
the manifestos of the party groups of the EP. Only the
Greens and the Left briefly mentioned fisheries in their
2019 manifestos. The overall picture remains rather un-
clear, suggesting very punctuated politicization. Does
this mean that an analysis of the CFP and its external di-
mension through the lens of politicization will inevitably
yield few benefits?
3. The ‘Layered Politicization’ of the CFP
This short review of the development of the CFP suggests
that any use of the concept of politicization to analyse
less prominent areas of EU external policies is problem-
atic. Is there anything to be gained from using this con-
cept to understand the dynamics in this policy field? I ar-
gue here that, with a more fine-grained conceptualiza-
tion of politicization, we can still capture increasing con-
testation, and explain effects such as an increasing like-
lihood of ratification failure. One way to move towards
this goal is to take into account recent advances in the lit-
erature on institutional change. This encompasses both
the descriptive and prognostic dimensions of politiciza-
tion (Rixen & Viola, 2015; Streeck & Thelen, 2005).
While many conceptualizations developed by the in-
stitutionalist literature are potentially useful, the recent
framework presented by Lowndes and Roberts (2013)
offers a good starting point. These authors see institu-
tions as composed of three layers: narratives, rules and
practices. This disaggregationmakes institutions not only
more intelligible; it also better helps us to understand
their effects and their reaction to politicization (Lowndes
& Roberts, 2013, p. 63).
Summarizing briefly, narratives designate the most
important discourses within an institution. Politicized
narratives suggest a highly contested discourse with con-
flicting interpretations about correct policies. Lowndes
and Roberts conceptualize rules as written clauses, reg-
ulations and laws. Such rules structure the political pro-
cess. If the rules of decision-making have developed in
such a way that they easily provoke intense political con-
flict and involve many potentially competing actors, we
can speak of politicized rules. Finally, practices describe
the conduct and policy-output of institutions. If the im-
plementation of agreed policies is publicly contested,
politicized practices can be observed.
In each of these three dimensions, the parliamen-
tarization of the CFP might have resulted in substantial
change. The involvement of the EP has given voice to
new actors. These actors may look to influence decision-
making by focusing directly onMEPs. Obviously, the layer
of rules has also changed greatly due to the introduction
of a new veto player.
Combining the three institutional layers with the di-
mensions of politicization cited by most of the relevant
literature yields the following table:
This table suggests the possibility of an ‘incomplete’
or ‘layered’ politicization in which not all the boxes will
be ticked. Narratives might be highly polarized and visi-
ble, whereas rules and practicesmight remain quite tech-
nocratic. It is also possible to imagine a policy field with a
highly politicized narrative and mobilized rules (due to a
wide array of actors), but which nonetheless fails to take
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Table 1. Layers of politicization.
Layers of Institutions
Dimensions of politicization Narratives Rules Practices
Salience/Visibility Salient Narrative Salient Rules Salient Practice
Polarization Polarized Narrative Polarized Rules Polarized Practice
Mobilization Mobilized Narrative Mobilized Rules Mobilized Practice
on much broader salience, and therefore does not gen-
erate much media attention. This is apparently the case
with the CFP.
Confronting this framework with the effects of politi-
cization yields various propositions. For example, it is
possible that, despite a politicized narrative, policy out-
put remains technocratic. This might be the result of
strongly path-dependent decision-making rules, or the
empowerment of important veto-players. By contrast,
thorough politicization would shape not only politicized
narratives; it would also result in a process in which deci-
sions aremade in an openly political contest within politi-
cized institutions (such as parliaments but not necessar-
ily parliamentary committees). This would lead to prac-
tices and results that are different from those of a purely
technocratic environment.
To detect layered politicization in the external dimen-
sion of the CFP, I will first trace the course of recent ne-
gotiations of important SFPAs. The aim is to establish
whether or not these have become more controversial,
in particular as a consequence of the involvement of
the EP. Second, this will allow me to identify a poten-
tially larger set of actors that are involved in the decision-
making process. As in the first section of this article, a
search on Nexis regarding the external dimension of the
CFP has been undertaken. This resulted in almost no hits.
4. Layered Politicization and SFPAs
The EU has signed more than twenty bilateral agree-
ments with third countries that deal with the access of
EU vessels to the exclusive economic zones of these coun-
tries. The protocols governing these agreements are peri-
odically renegotiated, with almost half of them currently
dormant. The EU pays a fee for access, and the EU fishing
industry is allowed to take the surplus yield. According
to the EU, these agreements set the standard for in-
ternational fisheries in terms of sustainability, benefits
for the local population and transparency. Nonetheless,
they are often depicted as exploitative. In the last decade,
the overall contestation of some of the agreements has
risen considerably. The following case studies use the
framework established in the preceding paragraphs to
trace this pattern of politicization and the role of the EP
in this process. I will then assess the impact of politiciza-
tion on the negotiation of SFPAs. As case studies, I have
selected the EU fisheries agreements with Morocco and
Mauritania, as these are perhaps themost important and
the most contested.
4.1. Morocco
Morocco was once a reliable fishing ground for the EU,
particularly for Spanish and Portuguese vessels. Early
fisheries agreements concluded in the 1980s and 1990s
were uncontroversial. In 1999, however, Morocco re-
fused to sign a new protocol, citing the exhaustion of
fish stocks. Despite strong efforts by the EC, a follow-up
protocol proved elusive until 2007. Following intense lob-
bying by the fishing industry, the EC finally presented a
new draft agreement. This draft provoked some contro-
versy in the Council. The reason was not the economic
or environmental dimension of the protocol, but rather
the very political problem of the inclusion of the wa-
ters of the Western Sahara. This territory, formerly oc-
cupied by Spain, has been governed by Morocco since
1975, against strong resistance by the local population.
The EU is internally divided on whether Morocco’s of-
ten brutally enforced annexation should be condoned.
These divisions are clearly shown by the convoluted
moniker given in EU official language to the region: a
“non-self-governing territory ‘de facto’ administered by
the Kingdom of Morocco”.
And yet this unusual territory also includes the best
fishing grounds (especially since Moroccan coastal wa-
ters are already quite empty). Many member states and
NGOs (such as Fishelsewhere.com, founded in 2006 by
Western Sahara activists) claim that the EU’s FPAs im-
plicitly recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the terri-
tory and lead to the exploitation of marine resources,
to the detriment of the inhabitants of Western Sahara,
the Saharawis. In 2007, Sweden voted against the EC’s
draft in the Council because of this problem. Other coun-
tries also voiced their concerns. Nonetheless, the proto-
col was ratified quite smoothly, reflecting a low level of
public salience and a technocratic decision-making pro-
cess that created only a few ripples within European pub-
lic opinion.
In 2011, when the agreement was on the verge of ex-
piration, Spain lobbied hard for an extension. However,
scientific evaluations of the previous protocol gave
its sustainability record a very poor rating (Oceanic
Développement, 2010). The EC had recently published
its Green Paper on the sorry state of the CFP. It thus tried
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to gain time for a new approach by requesting an exten-
sion for just one year. Even within the EC, opinions about
a new agreement were divided: DG Mare argued that
the waters of the Western Sahara should be excluded,
while other DGs stressed the overall importance of rela-
tions with Morocco (Jönsson, 2012, p. 29). A similar divi-
sion revealed itself within the Committee of Permanent
Representatives, which prepares Council meetings.
Despite these divisions, the Council gave the EC
a mandate to open negotiations in order to avoid a
new disruption of EU fishing activities. On this basis,
in February 2011, the EC quickly reached an agree-
ment with the Moroccan government that included the
Western Sahara. In June, the Council approved the re-
sult with a narrow majority. In December 2009, how-
ever, the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force, which
meant that the EP was now required to give its consent.
The PECH was still dominated by Spanish and French
Representatives, and it sidedwith the EC and the Council.
The Budget and Development Committees, however, rec-
ommended that the EP withhold its consent (Jönsson,
2012, p. 42).
Consequently, an intense debate developed in the
parliament. The controversy over the self-determination
of the Sawarahis, the ecological consequences of large-
scale fishing in Western African waters, and the devel-
opmental implications of the agreements became much
more visible with the mobilization of the EP. Previously,
this kind of polarized narrative had been stifled by tech-
nocratic rules. But now it came dramatically to the sur-
face. What’s more, critical groups suddenly had an insti-
tutional target beyond individual member states. Indeed,
in December 2011, the plenary of the EP rejected an
extension of the agreement on the grounds that the
EC had not demonstrated its ecologically sustainability
or economic viability, or that it would be beneficial to
the Saharawis. The EP demanded that any new proto-
col should respect international law, that it should be
sustainable, both in economic and ecological terms, and
that the uses of EU funds should be made transparent
(Passos, 2016, p. 93).
As a result of the EP vote, Morocco closed its fishing
grounds to all EU vessels. After vociferous protests by the
fishermen and the governments representing them, the
Council authorized the EC to continue the talks and to
push for an improved agreement, in particular with re-
spect to the concerns expressed by the EP. The EC then
drafted a new protocol with more detailed provisions on
how the money would be distributed within Morocco,
specifically to the Sawarahis (Interview with EC Official;
EP, 2013). The Council discussed the draft agreement
in early November 2013. Sweden and Denmark voted
against,while theUK,Netherlands and Finland abstained.
This was enough for a qualified majority.
On 10 December 2013, after extensive and heated
debate, the EP voted for the agreement with 310 votes
against 204 no-votes and 49 abstentions. In its resolution,
the EP demanded participation in the implementation of
the agreement by, for example, sending observers to the
EU-Moroccan joint committees set up by the protocol
(EP, 2013a). Naturally, the fishing industry was delighted
to gain access toMoroccan waters. But opponents of the
agreement, such as the Greens in the EP and NGOs sup-
porting the cause of the Saharawis, denounced the vote
as shameful. The episode showed that rules and prac-
tices in the negotiation of this agreement had become
polarized, and it demonstrated the increasing number of
actors that were mobilized during the process of policy
formulation. The days of a permissive consensus on the
negotiation of fisheries agreements with Morocco were
long gone.
The following years underlined this new reality. In
2014, the Frente Polisario, Western Sahara’s liberation
movement, launched a case at the European Court of
Justice to contest a separate agreement on trade in agri-
cultural products. In December 2015, the Court ruled
that trade agreements with Morocco could not apply to
the Western Sahara, causing Morocco to freeze its rela-
tions with the EU. The Council appealed against the deci-
sion and recently won the case (Court of Justice of the
European Union, 2016). NGOs fighting for the recogni-
tion of the rights of the Sawarahis, however, were em-
boldened. They challenged the fisheries agreements at
the Court. In fact, in February 2018, the Court published
another resolution in which it stated that a new agree-
ment could not cover thewaters adjacent to theWestern
Sahara, although the fisheries industry and Morocco
claimed that a considerable portion of the benefits of the
agreement accrued to the population of the disputed ter-
ritory. Consequently, the EU attempted to broaden the
negotiations by consulting representatives of all the rel-
evant territories. However, the Polisario declined to par-
ticipate. This did not stop the EC and the Moroccan gov-
ernment from implementing a newagreement, after con-
sultations with as many local representatives as seemed
possible under the circumstances.
When it came to a vote in the EP, the Greens de-
manded that once again the text should be referred to
the European Court of Justice (The Greens/EFA, 2019).
On February 2, 2019, however, Parliament finally gave
consent to a new four-year agreement, allowing about
130 EU vessels for a sum of €208m to fish in Moroccan
waters, including theWestern Sahara territory. 415MEPs
voted for the deal, with 189 against and 49 absten-
tions, despite vociferous protests by NGOs (EUObserver,
2019). The majority of the EP maintained that the agree-
ment would not constitute the recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty over Western Sahara. On March 4, the
Council gave its consent with a similar statement.
This case study shows unambiguously that, over the
past decade, both political contestation and the num-
ber of actors dealing with negotiations has risen contin-
uously. The role of the EP has been crucial in this re-
spect. The involvement of the Court is particularly note-
worthy. And yet the public salience of the issue remains
limited. A search of newspapers indexed in Nexis from
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1998–2017 showed that FPAswere discussed only in very
few articles. Most of the debate occurs in specialized in-
ternet publications, often those published by NGOs.
4.2. Mauritania
In terms of volume and financial contribution, the agree-
ment with Mauritania is the EU’s most important SFPA.
The renewal of the protocols thus attracted particular
attention from the fishing industry, NGOs and, more re-
cently, the EP itself. It did so only in the last decade, how-
ever. The 2012 renegotiation of the 2006 protocol turned
out to be riven with conflict, and it resulted in a com-
promise that was rejected by the EU fishing industry and
their allies in EU institutions.
The normative discourse established during the run-
up to the 2013 CFP reform and the empowerment of
the EP strongly influenced the decision-making process.
It gave particular clout to scientific evaluations which ar-
gued that previous protocols had caused depleted fish
stocks, to the detriment of the Mauritanian fishing sec-
tor (Oceanic Développement, 2011). In May 2011, the
EP adopted a resolution which demanded that the EU
fleet should only target the surplus of fish—that is, the
sustainable quantity above the level that was reached by
Mauritanian fishers. The EP further argued that themost
valuable species, octopus, should be excluded from the
new protocol (Corten, 2014, p. 3).
NegotiationswithMauritania began in June 2011 and
quickly became protracted, as the Mauritanians seized
on the new mood and ramped up their demands. They
were supported by vocal European and African NGOs
(Nagel & Gray, 2012). The fishing industry warned the EC
that a new protocol in line with Mauritanian conditions
would not be commercially viable (Corten, 2014, p. 4).
In July 2012, days before the expiration of the old proto-
col, the EC presented a provisional extension of the 2006
protocol, pending consent of the EP. It went very far in
meeting Mauritanian demands and reflected the philos-
ophy of the 2012 Green Paper.
As soon as the provisional text became known,
protests began. The EU fisheries industry lambasted
the agreement as commercially useless (EP, 2013b).
Subsequently, most EU vessels effectively ceased fish-
ing in the Mauritanian EEZ. And yet most member
states supported the result, even some with fishing in-
terests in Mauritania. They were presumably respond-
ing to pressure by NGOs in their countries (Corten, 2014,
p. 7). Another factor influencing member states’ sup-
port for the agreement was their interest in stabilizing
Mauritania given ongoing unrest inMali at the same time
(Interview with EC Official). Thus, the Council signed the
protocol in December 2012 and agreed to its provisional
application, until the EP gave its consent.
In February 2013, the EP Committee onDevelopment
recommended consent. However, three months later,
the PECH, under its Spanish rapporteurGabrielMato, rec-
ommended that the EP withhold its consent since the
protocol made no economic sense (EP, 2013c). In the
ensuing months, Spain initiated a strong campaign to
convince MEPs to vote against the agreement (Jönsson,
2012). However, numerous NGOs lobbied the parliamen-
tarians, and in the end they easily carried the day (EP,
2013b). In October 2013, the EP voted for the protocol
with 467 votes in favor and 154 votes against, with the lat-
ter coming especially from the European People’s Party.
This was signed in November.
The whole process underlined the ‘layered politiciza-
tion’ of the external dimension of the CFP. The parliamen-
tarization of SFPAnegotiationsmobilized newactorswho
were able to politicize the process. This gave rise to seri-
ous conflicts within all three major EU organs. However,
an evaluation of the subsequentmedia coverage of these
developments shows that public engagement with the is-
sue was still rather limited. While there was polarization
andmobilization in the layers of narratives and rules, the
low degree of salience remained.
A similar pattern was observable in the next round
of negotiations which ended, in November 2015, with
a new protocol coming into effect. In the early stages
of the negotiation of this protocol, the EP produced a
resolution on the external dimension of the CFP which
promoted the Mauritania deal as a potential model (EP,
2016). The resolution and the report on which this was
based (EP, 2015) was strongly influenced by the results of
a conference of the Long Distance Advisory Committee
(LDAC), an advisory body established by the Council and
EC in 2007. The LDAC combines representatives of indus-
try, NGOs, European states andmember states. In its rec-
ommendations, the Committee states that:
The essence of the partnership between African coun-
tries and the European Union should be the joint pro-
motion of sustainable environmental, social and eco-
nomic development based on transparency and the
participation of non-governmental stakeholders, es-
pecially the professionals who depend on fishing for
their livelihood. The conservation of resources and
the protection of the marine environment are essen-
tial in order to guarantee sustainable fishing for future
generations” (LDAC, 2015).
This was reflected in the protocol, despite strident
protests by the fishing industry (North Africa Post, 2015).
In addition to its strong normative content, the SFPA
again contained a provision which obliged Mauritania to
publish all agreements with other states or private enti-
ties which were entitled to access toMauritanian waters.
This was to ensure that other agreements with lower
standards would not undermine the objectives of the EU
SFPA and allow for other states to out-compete the EU.
As a result, Russia launched a complaint at the World
Trade Organization, opening another arena of contesta-
tion (EP, 2013b).
Overall, however, the process was less conflict-prone
than the earlier renegotiation. The protocol passed
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through the EP with a comfortable margin, although
it was strenuously denounced by critical NGOs (AEFJN,
2016). This probably reflects the fact that civil society
groups were more embedded in the process, while par-
liamentwasmore frequently consulted. In this sense, the
polarization and the mobilization of the rules dimension
became less pronounced.
One reason for the votemight have been the refugee
crisis of 2015. This drew attention to the fact that
Mauritania is a transit country, and that it has a long com-
mon border with troubled Mali. This provides another
opening for contestedmeanings that different actors will
attach to the agreement. The impending renegotiation
might become yet another partially politicized process.
5. Conclusions
Politicization is a concept that has been developed to ac-
count for the increasing but often diffuse contestation
of global and European governance. In their comprehen-
sive study on the politicization of European integration
in the past 50 years, Hutter et.al. argued that there was
no consistent pattern or trend towards the politicization
of EU politics. Instead, they observed significant varia-
tion across time and country, which they termed ‘punc-
tuated politicization’ (2016, p. 280). However, their re-
search concentrated on the big turning points and crises
of European integration. It is thus quite reasonable to
expect that, in a less prominent arena such as the CFP
and its external dimension, this pattern would be even
more pronounced.
As this article has demonstrated, some elements of
politicization can indeed be identified in the CFP, but
they are far from consistent and they have not yet mobi-
lized a broader public. To account for this incomplete pat-
tern, the concept of ‘layered politicization’ has been em-
ployed. Two decisive elements shape this ‘layered’ politi-
cization: the increasing prominence of a normative dis-
course on fisheries policy that was institutionalized with
the reform of the CFP (layer of narratives) and the parlia-
mentarization of the CFP as a consequence of the Lisbon
Treaty (layer of rules). Parliamentarization allowed for
many more actors to gain access to the decision-making
process. Such actors include expert committees and civil
society groups. Crucially, these actors now have a much
better chance to influence policy outcomes. External fish-
eries policy has become a contested policy field, and the
EP has becomea core arena. Facedwith a divided council,
its clout is considerable.
This also allows the EC to use the EP in a similar way
as US trade negotiators use Congress: as potential a veto-
player in a two-level game with counterparts in inter-
national negotiations, but also as a potentially legitimiz-
ing actor. Consequently, negotiations have also become
more complicated, with some fisheries protocols lapsing
and EU counterparts becoming increasingly upset about
the intrusiveness of the agreements. While many NGOs
still see the EU’s fisheries policy as exploitative, their in-
clusion in the process has made their arguments less
strident. The incomplete politicization of the external di-
mension of the CFP has had the same effects that were
identified for cases of comprehensive politicization: less
efficiency, but more legitimacy. Overall, then, the use of
a more fine-grained concept of politicization might en-
able future research to more systematically link specific
forms of politicization to particular policy outcomes.
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